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Abstract 
A common denominator of all neutron radiography (NRAD) facilities worldwide is that the perimeter of the experimental 
chamber of the facility is a radiation shielding structure which, in some cases, also includes flight tube and filter chamber 
structures. These chambers are normally both located on the beam port floor outside the biological shielding of the neutron 
source. The main function of the NRAD-shielding structure is to maintain a radiological safe working environment in the entire 
beam hall according to standards set by individual national radiological safety regulations.  In addition, the shielding’s integrity 
and capability should not allow, during NRAD operations, an increase in radiation levels in the beam port hall and thus 
negatively affect adjacent scientific facilities (e.g. neutron diffraction facilities). As a bonus, the shielding for the NRAD facility 
should also prevent radiation scattering towards the detector plane and doing so, thus increase the capability of obtaining better 
quantitative results. This paper addresses Monte Carlo neutron-particle transport simulations to theoretically optimize the 
shielding capabilities of the biological barrier for the SANRAD facility at the SAFARI-1 nuclear research reactor in South 
Africa. The experimental process to develop the shielding, based on the principles of the ANTARES facility, is described. After 
casting, the homogeneity distribution of these concrete mix materials is found to be near perfect and first order experimental 
radiation shielding characteristics through film badge (TLD) exposure show acceptable values and trends in neutron- and 
gamma-ray attenuation. 
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1. Introduction 
The development of any newly built, as well as any upgrade of a NRAD facility has to take into serious 
consideration the space available for the size of, in addition to the weight of the biological shield that forms the 
barrier. The radiological barrier, during operation, provides the shield between the high intensity radiation 
(neutrons and Gamma-rays) within the enclosure and the outside where the personnel should safely be able to 
work. Most of the building costs of NRAD facilities are caused by the design and construction of a radiation barrier 
for the safe operation of such facilities. However for many facilities, these barriers are not adequately being 
described in literature – e.g. the exact composition, material densities and thickness to fulfil its purpose are not 
reported. As an exception, the ANTARES NRAD personnel of FRMII have described the shielding of the old 
facility [Calzada (2005)] and the new facility [Calzada (2012), Calzada (2009)] in detail and thus emphasized the 
importance of adequate research and reporting of one of the most important  aspects of building an NRAD facility. 
This concept of using high density concrete shielding materials was developed when the first NRAD facilities were 
established and reported in [Aljreja (1986)]. However, not much attention was given and documented in the 
proceedings of  the first couple of world conference gatherings about any international NRAD facility shielding 
properties, and if so  not much detail was reported. References to “heavy concrete” or “high density concrete” 
[Aljreja (1986), Jacobson (2010)] and the density from 4.2 - 4.8g/cc [Pasupathy (1982) ,Calzada (2012)] are the 
only detailed descriptions of the barrier that forms the perimeter of the NRAD facilities. Limited reports found 
from USA-NIST and China indicated only that the shielding providing the necessary protection is a steel encased 
mixture of wax and steel shot [NIST-http, Tang]. There the high energy neutrons are slowed down to thermal 
neutrons in the wax and stopped by the material while the gamma-rays are absorbed by the steel shot. 
Much attention in most papers describing NRAD facilities is given to applications of NRAD and to the 
infrastructure such as the neutron source, collimator composition and collimation and neutron- or gamma-ray filters 
to obtain a “clean and pure” neutron beam. However, it was shown with MCNP-X simulations that the composition 
and thickness of the shielding has a major effect on the background radiation within the NRAD facility and thus a 
detrimental effect on the quality of radiographs when quantitative NRAD is being performed [Hassanein (2010)]. 
The Monte Carlo Transport Particle Code (MCNP-X) [Briesmeister (1996)] has been extensively used for the 
simulation of NRAD collimators at e.g. at the Malaysian Institute for Nuclear Technology Research (MINT), 
Malaysia, and for example the development of new radiography facilities at NUR-3 [IAEA-TECDOC-
1604(2006)], the NRAD facility at the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC), India[IAEA-TECDOC-
1604(2006)] and ANTARES-II at FRMII, Germany [Calzada(2012)]. MCNP-X simulations  also successfully 
applied, as a first step, in the shielding design of the ANTARES NRAD facility in Garching, Germany-, [Calzada 
(2009),Calzada(2012), Grünauer (2005)], the NRAD  facilities in Thailand [Picha], Malaysia, [IAEA-TECDOC-
1604 (2006)], China (Peking University) [Wen (2011)], South Korea [Bai (2006)] and for the SANRAD facility in 
South Africa [Grünauer (2009)]. 
Proof of the integrity of the facility shielding to the national nuclear regulator (NNR) is a normal procedure. The 
approval by the NNR of the construction and operation forms also the basis of evaluation of the safety of the 
facility which is in the interest of the workers and public. Proof of the integrity of the shielding properties to 
provide adequate shielding is of utmost importance and it should be demonstrated by initial MCNP-X calculations, 
backed up and confirmed by physical experiments through foil activation and radiation dose measurements.  
This paper has the intention of serving as a guideline for newly planned NRAD facilities and to show how to 
approach the shielding design. Experience gained from the upgrade of the SANRAD facility at the SAFARI-1 
nuclear research reactor in South Africa which focused on its shielding characterisation will be given here. Specific 
pre-casting aspects such as MCNP-X characterisation, concrete development and the establishment of the final 
concrete mix as well as post casting examination such as tests of homogeneity of the constituents and the neutron 
shielding capabilities through dose meter experiments will be dealt with. Foil activation analyses and the process of 
implementation in radiation shielding characterisation for the SANRAD facility are described in another paper 
within these proceeding [Radebe (2015)].
 F.C. de Beer et al. /  Physics Procedia  69 ( 2015 )  115 – 123 117
2. Upgraded NRAD facility layout 
The existing (NRAD) facility, located on the beam port floor and at beam line position no. 2 at the SAFARI-1 
nuclear research reactor, is being upgraded in order to achieve higher quality radiographs, to increase operating 
safety and to become more versatile. The design of many of its components, such as the shielding blocks and 
collimators, has been adopted from the FRM-II, ANTARES NRAD facility in Germany. Their only applicable 
fundamental safety function is shielding from radiation and the system is designed to (a) return to the fail safe state, 
i.e. to close the shutters in the beam line in any unwanted or accidental condition and (b) to remain in a safe 
condition, i.e. not to open the shutters if certain conditions are not met – e.g. if the facility door is open. 
To reach these above-mentioned conditions during operation implies that the shielding has to be adequate enough 
to provide safe shielding and protection to personnel outside of the facility in either operational or accidental mode. 
Fig-1 shows the shielding layout of the proposed SANRAD facility with the shielding blocks interlacing with each 
other to complete the barrier for the several sections – filter box chamber, secondary shutter, flight tube chamber 
and experimental chamber. 
Fig.1. Model of the SANRAD facility 
The entire facility is designed for the steel boxes to interlace with each other in order to prevent radiation 
leakage through a straight path at any part of the shielding. Fig-2 shows the CAD-models of a number of these 
boxes within the facility. The multiple angles and corners of each of the boxes provide, together with the other 
boxes, a complete attenuation of the radiation beam.  
Fig.2. Models of the steel boxes showing their interlace  
The interlock design concept for the boxes adopted from the German design allows that any small shrinkage 
effects around the perimeter of the blocks are completely mitigated. An indirect ray path, also along the edge of a 
steel box, by nature, represents a weak beam of very low intensity due to the small solid angle randomly selected 
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from a much more isotropic radiation field. This narrow beam always runs up against a high density concrete 
barrier that remains to be transmitted. 
No concrete shrinkage through visual inspection of the cast materials, neither in a test slab nor in the cast 
concrete blocks could be observed or measured after 28 days of casting. The steel boxes maintained their original 
shape and did not bulge due to internal steel struts keeping the steel structures stable and intact. To make sure all 
corners of the boxes are filled with concrete mix, holes were drilled in the corners to let air escape. The concrete 
mix filling the corners and pouring from the hole can be observed (See Fig-3 and -4). 
                 
Fig. 3. Shielding steel boxes prior to casting concrete. Large enough holes at the top provided for easy concrete pouring. The laminated 
structures of the steel blocks are observed for optimal shielding capability when interlaced. 
Fig. 4.Shielding steel boxes during concrete casting process. Concrete pouring from the corner hole (left) indicating adequate filling of the 
corners of the boxes. Steel shot (small spherical particles) and hematite rocks (right) observed at the top of one of the boxes during pouring 
indicating adequate mixing and homogeneity of the concrete mix.  
The total radiation shielding barrier comprises, in a cross 
section layout (See Fig-5), firstly,  a 200mm thick borated 
polyethylene cover, then a 10mm steel casing, and depending on 
the position of the shielding, a 1000mm, an 800mm or a 600mm 
thick high density concrete filling with the 10mm thick steel 
casing at the back. The total weight of shielding materials being 
put onto the beam port floor of the SAFARI-1 nuclear reactor is ~ 
600 tonnes, which requires additionally strengthening of the floor.  
3. MCNP-X Simulations to optimize radiation shielding 
The initial step is to know, as accurate as possible, the neutron- and gamma-ray distribution spectrum as well as 
their intensities emanating from the source (reactor/isotope/spallation source).  After a raw estimation of the needed 
shielding composition and thickness, a MCNP-X model is generated. Through many computer simulation iterations 
of the attenuation of primary neutron- and gamma-rays by the model, the effective material shielding composition 
and thickness are optimized. Optimization through MCNP-X simulations is a long and tedious process if the 
Radiation 
Inside Barrier: 
20cm B-PE 
Thickness: Concrete mix:
60cm, 80cm or 100cm  
Each: 1cm Fe  
Fig.5. Cross section of the radiation shielding barrier 
of the SANRAD facility 
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optimal composition of the barrier mix for best shielding properties has to be “discovered”. For the South African 
case, the simulations for the SANRAD facility could proceed immediately as the state-of-the-art shielding 
composition and thickness, as being used at the FRMII-ANTARES-I facility in Germany, were adopted. Only after 
the seventh MCNP-X iteration, due to changes in the shielding concept and layout of the facility, was a final design 
adopted [Grünauer, 2009] and streamlined for the South African conditions as depicted in Fig-6 [Korochinsky, 
2012]. The update included an equilibrium Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) core, new internal geometry of the beam 
(which included the removal of the old collimator and the incorporation of the new wall coupling plate), and the 
latest layout and material composition of the experimental chamber. The dose rates were calculated for the worst 
possible case, namely at the horizontal and vertical planes that include the axis of the beam, and when the beam is 
fully open (no collimator and no filters), which is envisaged to be needed a very small fraction of the time the 
facility operates. For this condition both the thickness of the walls as well as their material composition were 
defined as to achieve the target of <1 ȝSv/h for contact dose rate with the objective of minimizing background 
radiation to the neighboring beam line facility instruments (Small Angle Neutron Scattering and Neutron Powder 
Diffractometer).   The calculations 
show that the contact dose rates 
around the whole facility (side walls 
and roof) meet the requirement, with 
the only exception being the back wall 
(directly exposed to the open beam) 
where the contact dose rate at the 
hottest spot does not exceeds 
10ȝSv/h. To achieve this, not only a 
thicker wall was designed but also a 
beam stopper was included in the 
model. The design of the beam 
stopper can be optimized further, but 
the current proposal (as modelled) is 
enough to meet the blue radiation area 
classification limit for the area outside the NRAD facility and beam port floor of 25ȝSv/h.  
To add conservativeness to the final MCNP-X calculations, heavy concrete with density 4.0 g/cm3 was used in 
the model instead of the nominal density of 4.3 g/cm3. Table-1 shows the mix of the main constituents that 
contributes to radiation attenuation namely hematite, colemanite and steel shot,  the recipe of the radiation 
shielding of the ANTARES facility in Germany,  the updated South African simulation and real casting 
composition.  
Table-1.Composition of concrete mix main constituents in development for SANRAD facility. 
Constituent Simulation: 
Germany 
Simulation: 
South 
Africa 
Casted 
Concrete  
Density(g/cc) 4.7 4.0 4.22
Hematite 60.1% 55.6% 56.8%
Colemanite 1.6% 2.3% 2.4%
Steel shot 13.6% 26.6% 36%
Water 4.9% 2.4% 3.6
µSv/h
Fig.6. MCNP-X simulations showing the shielding capability for the upgraded 
SANRAD facility for whole neutron spectrum of SAFARI-1 
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4. Cast concrete characteristics  
4.1. Physical capabilities 
Taking the well-defined concrete design of the ANTARES facility as baseline and also using them in the 
MCNP-X calculations, an extensive research program was followed (Ramushu (2011) to find the final mix and 
composition of the concrete before casting. Through casting of test samples in 8 iterations, a final mix for the South 
African conditions (type of cement, sand, hematite etc.) was found to provide the best one for the density needed 
for shielding, ensuring a homogeneous distribution of the particles without segregation and other concrete related 
parameters (e.g. slump, strength, density). A few of the important physical parameters are described in the 
following paragraphs. 
4.2. Physical properties of cast concrete. 
Certain physical properties related to concrete casting play an important role in the success of the final product 
– even more so for an NRAD facility. For any NRAD facility, the density of the concrete plays the most important 
part in the attenuation of the neutron- and gamma-ray beams.  Table-2 lists the main physical properties of the cast 
concrete blocks where cube size samples were taken from each concrete batch that had been poured into the steel 
containers for evaluation.  
Table-2.Physical properties of the casted concrete.
Slump 
(mm) 
28 day 
fcu* 
(MPa) 
28 day 
Density 
(kg/m3) 
510 43.6 ± 1.8 4232 ± 132 
*fcu is defined as a characteristic strength of concrete 
4.3. Homogeneity 
A homogeneous distribution of the main constituents of the concrete mix inside the steel boxes is of absolute 
importance to provide the same radiation shielding capability throughout the entire shielding block - from the top, 
where the concrete was poured into the box, to the bottom of the box. Visual inspection was done on a cast 
shielding block with one side of 10mm thick steel being removed – as shown in Fig-7. Counting of steel spheres 
(and spherically impressed cavities) revealed a homogeneous steel sphere distribution over the three exposed areas, 
to within the inherent statistical variation of sphere distribution over smaller adjacent areas (Fig-8). This shows that 
no discernible systematic segregation of steel spheres could be observed. The observation is consistent with a 
theoretical estimate that indicates stability against segregation for the steel balls in the used size range. 
4.4. Radiation shielding capabilities. 
After casting and curing of the final mix of cubic cast concrete samples (10x10x10cm3), physical foil-activation 
and radiation dose measurements were performed as a qualitative assessment of the shielding’s capability to 
attenuate both neutrons and gamma-rays. Tests were performed at the old SANRAD facility with a Bi-filtered 
beam. No scattered radiation corrections on the measured values were made. A detailed foil activation study was 
performed and it is being reported elsewhere in these proceedings (Radebe, 2015). Only the results of the dose 
measurements for neutrons and gamma-rays are being reported here. Fig-9 shows the schematic experimental setup 
as well as the experimental setup in the NRAD chamber. The radiation beam was collimated from 300mm to a 
narrow 50mm diameter beam to minimize unwanted scattered neutrons from the chamber. Results of the dose 
measurements for neutrons and gamma-rays with increased shielding thickness are shown in Fig-10 and Table-3 
respectively.    
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Fig.9. Schematic- and physical layout of the experiments with the dose meters inside the NRAD experimental chamber  
Table-3 lists the dose counts obtained by the neutron- and gamma TLD’s. (note: The lower gamma counts are 
due to Bi-filtering of the radiation beam and small cubes of material were used in the experiment – thus secondary 
gamma-ray generation was minimized.) The approximate neutron- and gamma-ray linear attenuation coefficients 
derived from the data of Table-3 are 0.112 and 0.07 respectively. Using these attenuation parameters together with 
arbitrary high initial values of 100000 (approximation results thus into ~200% more neutrons and ~3000% more 
gammas) neutron and gamma-ray counts, Fig-10 shows that for a 60cm concrete thickness, a 99.88% and 98.5% 
drop of neutrons and gamma-rays counts respectively, is possible. The reason why so much more gamma-rays are 
simulated than what was measured is to take into account also   secondary gamma-ray generation in the material 
upon neutron absorption for a full unfiltered white spectrum neutron beam.  
Fig-10 shows that the shielding capability and requirements for neutron attenuation are met as the SANRAD 
concrete shielding thickness is varied from 60, 80 to 100cm. These results were validated through foil activation 
measurements for neutrons using the same experimental set-up and are being reported elsewhere in these 
conference proceedings. 
  
Fig.7. TOP: Schematic of a shield block with 
exposed top, middle and bottom windows. 
BOTTOM: Photograph of the three exposed areas, 
showing uniform general aggregate consistency in 
all three exposed windows (top window is on the 
left).
Fig.8. Average number of steel shot balls counted at the top, 
middle and bottom positions of the exposed surfaces on the test 
concrete block in 10cm2 strips within each position 
1 x TLD for neutrons and gamma-
ray activation in each position 
between the concrete blocks 
Beam 
collimation 
Thickness of concrete blocks :80cm
(5 x 2cm) & (7 x 10cm) 
Radiation beam axis 
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Table-3.TLD counts for neutrons and Gamma-rays 
Shielding 
thickness 
(cm) 
NEUTRON 
TLD: 
(Counts) 
GAMMA-
RAY TLD: 
(Counts) 
0 37233 280 
2 5512 277 
4 3509 78 
6 3406 18 
8 3276 17 
10 63 19 
80 14 2 
Fig. 10.Trend of attenuation of neutron- and gamma-ray radiation in laboratory concrete samples through TLD exposure and analysis 
5. Conclusions 
The description  of the process to develop and characterize the radiation shielding for the upgraded NRAD 
facility has theoretically demonstrated, that the locally developed concept is completely adequate for the safe 
operation of the facility i.e. that the radiation levels are far below the minimum of 10µSv/h for radiological safety. 
Additionally, it provides adequate shielding for minimizing background radiation at the neighbouring neutron 
facilities (e.g. NDIFF and SANS). This local concept is based on the internationally proven model (ANTARES at 
TUM in Germany) which was slightly altered to fit the experimental conditions of the SAFARI-1 research reactor 
and for South African concrete casting conditions. 
Furthermore, the study confirmed that the final developed concrete mix used in the pouring and casting process 
meets all the requirements specified for structural and shielding purposes, i.e. strength and longevity. It implies that 
(a) the aggregates used in the mix contained no elements that will lead to radioisotopes with long half-lives, (b) the 
water used for casting has no mineral content that will lead to enhanced corrosion of the steel components of the 
mix, (c) the required minimum density of 4000kg/m3 as simulated in the MCNP-X calculations was exceeded, (d) 
the mix was of the desired slump and cohesion and that(e) the 28 day cube strength achieved is well above the 
desired 25MPa limit at 43.6MPa.  
It was practically demonstrated through first order experiments with gold foils and radiological film badges on 
cast concrete laboratory samples from the final concrete mix, that the radiological shielding capability and 
requirements for neutron- and gamma-ray attenuation are met.  
Prior to casting, MCNP-X simulations of the total structure were performed and the optimal shielding solution 
was obtained.  After casting and curing, physical foil-activation and radiation dose measurements on the shielding 
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blocks were performed. A good assessment of the shielding’s capability for both neutrons and gamma-rays was 
obtained by these two methods.  
Evaluation of the concrete mix was done prior to, during and after the pouring into cast shielding steel blocks. 
This was necessary as steel spheres have the highest segregation potential of all aggregates. We conclude that all 
materials in the Necsa shield blocks are homogeneously distributed and will therefore provide homogeneous 
shielding behavior. 
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